SBFT: a Scalable and Decentralized Trust Infrastructure by Gueta, Guy Golan et al.
1SBFT: a Scalable and Decentralized Trust
Infrastructure
Guy Golan Gueta (VMware Research) Ittai Abraham (VMware Research) Shelly Grossman (TAU)
Dahlia Malkhi (VMware Research) Benny Pinkas (BIU) Michael K. Reiter (UNC-Chapel Hill)
Dragos-Adrian Seredinschi (EPFL) Orr Tamir (TAU) Alin Tomescu (MIT)
Abstract—SBFT is a state of the art Byzantine fault tolerant
permissioned blockchain system that addresses the challenges
of scalability, decentralization and world-scale geo-replication.
SBFT is optimized for decentralization and can easily handle
more than 200 active replicas in a real world-scale deployment.
We evaluate SBFT in a world-scale geo-replicated deployment
with 209 replicas withstanding f=64 Byzantine failures. We
provide experiments that show how the different algorithmic
ingredients of SBFT increase its performance and scalability.
The results show that SBFT simultaneously provides almost 2x
better throughput and about 1.5x better latency relative to a
highly optimized system that implements the PBFT protocol.
To achieve this performance improvement, SBFT uses a
combination of four ingredients: using collectors and threshold
signatures to reduce communication to linear, using an optimistic
fast path, reducing client communication and utilizing redundant
servers for the fast path.
I. INTRODUCTION
Centralization often provides good performance, but has the
drawback of posing a single point of failure [72] and econom-
ically, often creates monopoly rents and hampers innovation
[33]. The success of decentralization as in Bitcoin [61] and
Ethereum [75] have spurred the imagination of many as to the
potential benefits and significant potential value to society of
a scalable decentralized trust infrastructure.
While fundamentally permissionless, the economic friction
of buying and then running a Bitcoin or Ethereum mining
rig has inherent economies of scale and unfair advantages
to certain geographical and political regions. This means that
miners are strongly incentivized to join a small set of large
mining coalitions [55].
In a 2018 study, Gencer et al. [38] show that contrary to
popular belief, Bitcoin and Ethereum are less decentralized
than previously thought. Their study concludes that for both
Bitcoin and Ethereum, the top < 20 mining coalitions control
over 90% of the mining power. The authors comment “These
results show that a Byzantine quorum system of size 20 could
achieve better decentralization than Proof-of-Work mining at a
much lower resource cost”. This comment motivates the study
of BFT replication systems that can scale to many replicas and
are optimized for world scale wide area networks.
BFT replication is a key ingredient in consortium
blockchains [7], [15]. In addition, large scale BFT de-
ployments are becoming an important component of public
blockchains [26]. There is a growing interest in replacing
or combining the current Proof-of-Work mechanisms with
Byzantine fault tolerant replication [3], [4], [24], [69], [74].
Several recent proposals [11], [39], [43], [59], [63] explore
the idea of building distributed ledgers that elect a committee
(potentially of a few tens or hundreds of nodes) from a large
pool of nodes (potentially thousands or more) and have this
smaller committee run a Byzantine fault tolerant replication
protocol. In all these protocols, it seems that to get a high
security guarantee the size of the committee needs to be such
that it can tolerate at least tens of malicious nodes.
Scaling BFT replication to tolerate tens of malicious nodes
requires to re-think BFT algorithms and re-engineer them for
high scale. This is the starting point of our work.
A. SBFT: a Scalable Decentralized Trust Infrastructure for
Blockchains.
The main contribution of this paper is a BFT system that
is optimized to work over a group of hundreds of replicas
in a world-scale deployment. We evaluate our system, SBFT,
in a world-scale geo-replicated deployment with 209 replicas
withstanding f=64 Byzantine failures. We provide experiments
that show how the different algorithmic ingredients of SBFT
increase its performance and scalability. The results show that
SBFT simultaneously provides almost 2x better throughput
and about 1.5x better latency relative to a highly optimized
system that implements the PBFT [27] protocol.
Indeed SBFT design starts with the PBFT [27] protocol
and then proceeds to add four key design ingredients. Briefly,
these ingredients are: (1) going from PBFT to linear PBFT; (2)
adding a fast path; (3) using cryptography to allow a single
message acknowledgement; (4) adding redundant servers to
improve resilience and performance. We show how each of
the four ingredients improves the performance of SBFT. As
we will discuss in detail, each ingredient is related to some
previous work. The main contribution of SBFT is in the novel
combination of these ingredients into a robust system.
Ingredient 1: from PBFT to linear PBFT. Many previ-
ous systems, including PBFT [27], use an all-to-all message
pattern to commit a decision block. A simple way to reduce
an all-to-all communication pattern to a linear communication
pattern is to use a collector. Instead of sending to everyone,
each replica sends to the collector and this collector broadcasts
to everyone. We call this version linear PBFT. When messages
are cryptographically signed, then using threshold signatures
[25], [67] one can reduce the outgoing collector message size
from linear to constant.
Zyzzyva [46] used this pattern to reduce all-to-all commu-
nication by pushing the collector duty to the clients. SBFT
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2pushes the collector duty to the replicas in a round-robin
manner. We believe that moving the coordination burden to
the replicas is more suited to a blockchain setting where
there are many light-weight clients with limited connectivity.
In addition, SBFT uses threshold signatures to reduce the
collector message size and the total computational overhead of
verifying signatures. SBFT also uses a round-robin revolving
collector to reduce the load. SBFT uses c+1 collectors (instead
of one) to improve fault tolerance and handle c slow or faulty
collectors (where c is typically a small constant).
Ingredient 2: Adding a fast path. As in Zyzzyva [46],
SBFT allows for a faster agreement path in optimistic execu-
tions: where all replicas are non-faulty and synchronous. No
system we are aware of correctly incorporates a dual mode
that allows to efficiently run either a fast path or a slow
path. Previous systems tried to get a dual mode protocol to
do the right thing, especially in the view-change protocol,
but proved trickier than one thinks [9], [10]. We believe
SBFT implements the first correct and practical dual mode
view change. We rigorously analyzed and tested our view
change protocol. We note that Refined-Quorum-Systems [40],
a fast single shot Byzantine consensus protocol, does provide
a correct dual model but its protocol for obtaining liveness
seems to require exponential time computation in the worst
case (and is just single-shot). Azyzzyva [18], provides a fast
path State-Machine-Replication protocol and allows to switch
to a slow path, but avoids running both a fast path and a slow
path concurrently. So switching between modes in Azyzzyva
requires a lengthy view change each time for each switch,
while SBFT can seamlessly switch between paths (without a
view change).
Ingredient 3: reducing client communication from f+1 to
1. Once threshold signatures are used then an obvious next step
is to use them to reduce the number of messages a client needs
to receive and verify. In all previous solutions, including [20],
[27], [46], each client needs to receive at least f+1=O(n)
messages, each requiring a different signature verification for
request acknowledgement (where f is the number of faulty
replicas in a system with n = 3 f + 1 replicas). When there
are many replicas and many clients, this may add significant
overhead. In SBFT, in the common case, each client needs
only one message, containing a single public-key signature for
request acknowledgement. This single message improvement
means that SBFT can scale to support many extremely thin
clients.
SBFT reduces the per-client linear cost to just one message
by adding a phase that uses an execution collector to aggregate
the execution threshold signatures and send each client a single
message carrying one signature. Just like public blockchains
(Bitcoin and Ethereum), SBFT uses a Merkle tree to efficiently
authenticate information that is read from just one replica.
SBFT uses Boneh–Lynn–Shacham (BLS) signatures [23]
which have security that is comparable to 2048-bit RSA
signatures but are just 33 bytes long. Threshold signatures [22]
are much faster when implemented over BLS (see Section III).
Ingredient 4: adding redundant servers to improve
resilience and performance. SBFT is safe even if there are
f Byzantine failures, but the standard fast path works only if
all replicas are non-faulty and the system is synchronous. So
even a single slow replica may tilt the system from the fast
path to the slower path. To make the fast path more prevalent,
SBFT allows the fast path to tolerate up to a small number c
(parameter) of crashed or straggler nodes out of n = 3 f +2c+1
replicas. This approach follows the theoretical results that has
been suggested before in the context of single-shot consensus
algorithms [54]. So SBFT only falls back to the slower path
if there are more than c (and for safety fewer than f ) faulty
replicas. In our experiments we found that setting c ≤ f /8 is
a good heuristic for up to a few hundreds of replicas.
B. Evaluating SBFT’s scalability.
We implemented SBFT as a scalable BFT engine and
a blockchain that executes EVM smart contracts [75] (see
Section VIII).
All our experimental evaluation is done in a setting that
withstands f = 64 Byzantine failures in a real Wide Area
Network deployment.
We first conduct standard key-value benchmark experiments
with synthetic workloads. We start with a scale optimized
PBFT and then show how adding each ingredient helps
improve performance.
While standard key-value benchmark experiments with syn-
thetic workloads are a good way to compare the BFT engine
internals, we realize that real world blockchains like Ethereum
have a very different type of execution workload based on
smart contracts.
We conduct experiments on real world workloads for our
blockchain in order to measure the perfomance of a more
realisic workload. Our goal is not to do a comparison of a
permissioned BFT system against a permissionless proof-of-
work system, this is clearly not a fair comparison.
We take 500,000 smart contract executions that were pro-
cessed by Ethereum during a 2 months period. Our experi-
ments show that in a world-scale geo-replicated deployment
with 209 replicas withstanding f=64 Byzantine failures, we
obtain throughput of over 170 smart contract transactions
per second with average latency of 620 milliseconds. Our
Experiments show that SBFT simultaneously provides almost
2x better throughput and about 1.5x better latency relative to a
highly optimized system that implements the PBFT protocol.
We conclude that SBFT is more scalable and decentralized
relative to previous BFT solutions. Relative to state-of-art
proof-of-work systems like Ethereum, SBFT can run the same
smart contracts at a higher throughput, better finality and
latency, and can withstand f = 64 colluding members out
of more than 200 replicas. Clearly, Ethereum and other proof-
of-work systems benefit from being an open permissionless
system, while SBFT is a permissioned blockchain system. We
leave the integration of SBFT in a permissionless system for
future work.
We are not aware of any other permissioned blockchain
system that can be freely used and can be deployed in a
world scale WAN that can scale to over 200 replicas and
can withstand f = 64 Byzantine failures. We therefore spent
several months significantly improving, fixing and hardening
3an existing PBFT code-base in order to make it reliably work
in our experimental setting. We call this implementation scale
optimized PBFT and experimentally compare it to SBFT.
Contributions. The main contribution of this paper is a
BFT system that is optimized to work over a group of hun-
dreds of replicas and supports the execution of modern EVM
smart contract executions in a world-scale geo-distributed
deployment. SBFT obtains its scalability via a combination
of 4 algorithmic ingredients: (1) using a collector to obtain
linear communication, (2) adding a fast path with a correct
view change protocol, (3) reducing client communication
using collectors and threshold signatures, (4) adding redundant
servers for resilience and performance. While our view change
protocol is new, one could argue that the other ingredients
mentioned have appeared in some form in previous work.
Nevertheless, SBFT is the first to careful weave and implement
all these ingredients into a highly efficient and scalable BFT
system.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We assume a standard asynchronous BFT system model
where an adversary can control up to f Byzantine nodes
and can delay any message in the network by any finite
amount (in particular we assume a re-transmit layer and allow
the adversary to drop any given packet a finite number of
times). To obtain liveness and our improved results we also
distinguish two special conditions. We say that the system is
in the synchronous mode, when the adversary can control up
to f Byzantine nodes, but messages between any two non-
faulty nodes have a known bounded delay. Finally we say
that the system is in the common mode, when the adversary
only controls c ≤ f nodes that can only crash or act slow,
and messages between any two non-faulty nodes have a
known bounded delay. This three-mode model follows that
of Parameterized FaB Paxos [54].
For n = 3 f + 2c + 1 replicas SBFT obtains the following
properties:
(1) Safety in the standard asynchronous model (adversary
controlling at most f Byzantine nodes and all network delays).
This means that any two replicas that execute a decision block
for a given sequence number, execute the same decision block.
(2) Liveness in the synchronous mode (adversary controlling
at most f Byzantine nodes). Roughly speaking, liveness means
that client requests return a response.
(3) Linearity in the common mode (adversary controlling at
most a constant c slow/crashed nodes). Linearity means that in
an abstract model where we assume the number of operations
in a block is O(n) and we assume the number of clients is
also O(n), then the amortized cost to commit an operation is a
constant number of constant size messages. In more practical
terms, Linearity means that committing each block takes a
linear number of constant size messages and that each client
sends and receives receives just one message per operation.
III. MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY
We use threshold signatures, where for a threshold pa-
rameter k, any subset of k from a total of n signers can
collaborate to produce a valid signature on any given message,
but no subset of less than k can do so. Threshold signatures
have proved useful in previous BFT algorithms and systems
(e.g., [13], [14], [25], [67]). Each signer holds a distinct private
signing key that it can use to generate a signature share. We
denote by xi(d) the signature share on digest d by signer i.
Any k valid signature shares {xj(d) | j ∈ J, |J | = k} on the
same digest d can be combined into a single signature x(d)
using a public function, yielding a digital signature x(d). A
verifier can verify this signature using a single public key. We
use threshold signature schemes which are robust, meaning
signers can efficiently filter out invalid signature shares from
malicious participants.
We use a robust threshold signature scheme based on
Boneh–Lynn–Shacham (BLS) signatures [23]. While RSA
signatures are built in a group of hidden order, BLS are
built using pairings [41] over elliptic curve groups of known
order. Compared to RSA signatures with the same security
level, BLS signatures are substantially shorter. BLS requires
33 bytes compared to 256 bytes for 2048-bit RSA. Creating
and combining RSA signature shares via interpolation in
the exponent requires several expensive operations [67]. In
contrast, BLS threshold signatures [22] allow straightforward
interpolation in the exponent with no additional overhead.
Unlike RSA, BLS signature shares support batch verification,
allowing multiple signature shares (even of different messages)
to be validated at nearly the same cost of validating only one
signature [22].
We assume a computationally bounded adversary that can-
not do better than known attacks as of 2018 on the crypto-
graphic hash function SHA256 and on BLS BN-P254 [21]
based signatures. We use a PKI setup between clients and
replicas for authentication.
IV. SERVICE PROPERTIES
SBFT provides a scalable fault tolerant implementation of
a generic replicated service (i.e., a state machine replication
service). On top of this we implement an authenticated key-
value store that uses a Merkle tree interface [58] for data
authentication. On top of this we implement a smart con-
tract layer capable of running EVM byte-code. This layered
architecture allows us in the future to integrate other smart
contract languages by simply connecting them to the generic
authenticated key-value store and allow for better software
reuse.
Generic service. As a generic replication library, SBFT
requires an implementation of the following service interface
to be received as an initialization parameter. The interface
implements any deterministic replicated service with state,
deterministic operations and read-only queries. An execution
val = execute(D, o) modifies state D according to the oper-
ation o and returns an output val. A query val = query(D, q)
returns the value of the query q given state D (but does not
change state D). These operations and queries can perform
arbitrary deterministic computations on the state.
The state of the service moves in discrete blocks. Each block
contains a series of requests. We denote by Dj the state of
4the service at the end of sequence number j. We denote by
reqj the series of operations of block j, that changes the state
from state Dj−1 to state Dj .
An authenticated key-value store. For our blockchain
implementation we use a key-value store. In order to support
efficient client acknowledgement from one replica we augment
our key-value store with a data authentication interface. As in
public permissionless blockchains, we use a Merkle trees inter-
face [58] to authenticate data. To provide data authentication
we require an implementation of the following interface: (1)
d = digest(D) returns the Merkle hash root of D as digest.
(2) P = proof (o, l, s,D, val) returns a proof that operation o
was executed as the lth operation in the series of requests in
the decision block whose sequence number is s, whose state
is D and the output of this operation was val. For a key-
value store, proof for a put operation is a Merkle tree proof
that the put operation was conducted as the lth operation in
the requests of sequence number s. For a read only-query q,
we write P = proof (q, s,D, val) and assume all such queries
are executed with respect to Ds (the state D after completing
sequence number s). For a key-value store, proof for a get
operation is a Merkle tree proof that at the state with sequence
number s the required variable has the desired value. (3)
verify(d, o, val, s, l, P) returns true iff P is a valid proof that
o was executed as the lth operation in sequence number s and
the resulting state after this decision block was executed has
a digest of d and val is the return value for operation o (and
similarly verify(d, q, val, s, P) when q is a query). For a key-
value store and a put operation above, the verification is the
Merkle proof verification [58] rooted at the digest d (Merkle
hash root).
A Smart contract engine. We build upon the replicated
key-value store a layer capable of executing Ethereum smart
contracts. This layered architecture allows us in the future to
integrate other smart contract languages by simply connecting
them to the generic authenticated key-value store and allow
for better software reuse. The EVM layer consists of two main
components: (1) An implementation of the Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM), which is the runtime engine of contracts; (2)
An interface for modeling the two main Ethereum transaction
types (contract creation and contract execution) as operations
in our replicated service. Ethereum contracts are written in a
language called EVM bytecode [75], a Turing-complete stack-
based low-level language, with special commands designed for
the Ethereum platform. The key-value store keeps the state
of the ledger service. In particular, it saves the code of the
contracts and the contracts’ state. The fact that EVM bytecode
is deterministic ensures that the new state digest will be equal
in all non-faulty replicas.
V. SBFT REPLICATION PROTOCOL
We maintain n = 3 f +2c+1 replicas where each replica has
a unique identifier in {1, . . . , 3 f + 2c + 1}. This identifier is
used to determine the threshold signature in the three threshold
signatures: σ with threshold (3 f + c + 1), τ with threshold
(2 f + c + 1), and pi with threshold ( f + 1).
We adopt the approach of [27], [62] where replicas move
from one view to another using a view change protocol. In a
view, one replica is a primary and others are backups. The
primary is responsible for initiating decisions on a sequence
of decisions. Unlike PBFT [27], some backup replicas can
have additional roles as Commit collectors and/or Execution
collectors. In a given view and sequence number, c + 1 non-
primary replicas are designated to be C-collectors (Commit
collectors) and c + 1 non-primary replicas are designated
to be E-collectors (Execution collectors). These replicas are
responsible for collecting threshold signatures, combining
them and disseminating the resulting signature. For liveness,
a single correct collector is needed. We use c + 1 collectors
for redundancy in the fast path (inspired by RBFT [17]). This
increases the worst case message complexity to O(cn) = O(n)
when we assume c is a small constant (for n ≈ 200 we
set c = 0, 1, 2, 8 with f = 64). In practice we stagger the
collectors, so in most executions just one collector is active
and the others just monitor in idle.
Roughly speaking the algorithm works as follows in the fast
path (see Figure 1 for n = 4, f = 1, c = 0):
(1) Clients send operation request to the primary.
(2) The primary gathers client requests, creates a decision
block and forwards this block to the replicas as a pre-prepare
message.
(3) Replicas sign the decision block using their σ (3 f + c+
1)-threshold signature and send a sign-share message to the
C-collectors.
(4) Each C-collector gathers the signature shares, creates a
succinct full-commit-proof for the decision block and sends
it back to the replicas. This single message commit proof
has a fixed-size overhead, contains a single signature and is
sufficient for replicas to commit.
Steps (2), (3) and (4) require linear message complex-
ity (when c is constant) and replace the quadratic message
exchange of previous solutions. By choosing a different C-
collector group for each decision block, we balance the load
over all replicas.
Once a replica receives a commit proof it commits the
decision block. The replica then starts the execution protocol:
(1) When a replica has finished executing the sequence of
blocks preceding the committed decision block, it executes
the requests in the decision block and signs a digest of the
new state using its pi ( f + 1) threshold signature, and sends a
sign-state message to the E-collectors.
(2) Each E-collector gathers the signature shares, and creates
a succinct full-execute-proof for the decision block. It then
sends a certificate back to the replicas indicating the state is
durable and a certificate back to the client indicating that its
operation was executed.
This single message has fixed-size overhead, contains a
single signature and is sufficient for acknowledging individual
clients requests.
Steps (1) and (2) provide single-message per-request ac-
knowledgement for each client. All previous solutions required
a linear number of messages per-request acknowledgement
for each client. When the number of clients is large this is
a significant advantage.
Once again, by choosing a different E-collector group for
each decision block, we spread the overall load of primary
5leadership, C-collection, and E-collection, among all the repli-
cas.
Primary
C-Collector
E-Collector
Replica
Client
Request
Pre-prepare Sign-share Full-commit-
Proof
Sign-state
Execute-ack
Full-execute-
proof
Fig. 1. Schematic message flow for n=4, f=1, c=0.
A. The Client
Each client k maintains a strictly monotone timestamp t
and requests an operation o by sending a message 〈“request”,
o, t, k〉 to what it believes is the primary. The primary then
sends the message to all replicas and replicas then engage in
an agreement algorithm.
Previous systems required clients to wait for f + 1 replies
to accept an execution acknowledgment. In our algorithm the
client waits for just a single reply 〈“execute-ack”, s, val,
o, pi(d), proof (o, l, s,D, val)〉 from one of the replicas, and
accepts val as the response from executing o by verifying
that proof (o, l, s,D, val) is a proof that o was executed as the
lth operation of the decision block that resulted in the state
whose sequence number is s, the return value of o was val,
the digest of Ds is d. This is done by checking the Merkle
proof verify(d, o, val, s, l, proof (o, l, s,D, val)) = true and that
pi(d) is a valid signature for Ds (when o is long we just send
the digest of o).
Upon accepting an execute-ack message the client marks o
as executed and sets val as its return value.
As in previous protocols, if a client timer expires before
receiving an execute-ack, the client resends the request to all
replicas (and requests a PBFT style f + 1 acknowledgement
path).
B. The Replicas
The state of each replica includes a log of accepted mes-
sages sorted by sequence number, view number and message
type. The state also includes the current view number, the last
stable sequence number ls (see Section V-F), the state of the
service D after applying all the committed requests. We also
use a known constant win that limits the number of outstanding
blocks.
Each replica has an identity i ∈ {1, . . . , n} used to determine
the value of the three threshold key shares: σi for a 3 f + c+1
threshold scheme, τi for a 2 f + c+1 threshold scheme, and pii
for a f+1 threshold scheme. All messages between replicas are
done using authenticated point-to-point channels (in practice
using TLS 1.2).
As detailed below, replicas can have additional roles of
being a primary (Leader), a C-collector (Commit collector)
or an E-collector (Execution collector).
The primary for a given view is chosen in a round robin
way as a function of view. It also stores a current sequence
number
The C-collectors and E-collector for a given view and
sequence number are chosen as a pseudo-random group from
all non-primary replicas, as a function of the sequence number
and view1. For the fall back Linear-PBFT protocol we always
choose the primary as the last collector.
The role of a C-collector is to collect commit messages and
send a combined signature back to replicas to confirm commit.
The role of an E-collector is to collect execution messages and
send a combined signature back to replicas and clients so they
all have a certificate that their request is executed.
C. Fast Path
The fast path protocol is the default mode of execution. It is
guaranteed to make progress when the system is synchronous
and there are at most c crashed/slow replicas.
To commit a new decision block the primary starts a three
phase protocol: pre-prepare, sign-share, commit-proof. In the
pre-prepare phase the primary forwards its decision block
to all replicas. In the sign-share phase, each replica signs
the requests using its threshold signature and sends it to
the C-collectors. In the commit-proof phase, each C-collector
generates a succinct signature of the decision and sends it to
all replicas.
Pre-prepare phase: The primary accepts 〈“request”, o, t, k〉
from client k if the operation o passes the static service
authentication and access control rules. Note that this is a state
independent test which can be changed via a reconfiguration
view change.
Upon accepting at least b ≥ batch client messages (or
reaching a timeout) it sets r = (r1, . . . , rb) and broadcasts
〈“pre-prepare”, s, v, r〉 to all 3 f + 2c + 1 replicas where s is
the current sequence number, and v is the view number.
The parameter batch is set via an adaptive algorithm.
Roughly speaking the value of batch is set to be the average
number of pending requests divided by the half the maximum
amount of allowed concurrent blocks (this number number was
to 4 in the experiments).
Sign-share phase: A replica accepts 〈“pre-prepare”, s, v, r〉
from the primary if (1) its view equals v; (2) no previous
“pre-prepare” with the sequence s was accepted for view v;
(3) the sequence number s is between ls and ls + win; (4) r
is a valid series of operations that pass the authentication and
access control requirements.
Upon accepting a pre-prepare message, replica i computes
h = H(s | |v | |r) where H is a cryptographic hash function
(SHA256) then signs h by computing a verifiable threshold
signature σi(h) and sends 〈“sign-share”, s, v, σi(h)〉 to the set
of C-collectors C-collectors(s, v).
1Randomly choosing the primary and the collectors to provide resilience
against a more adaptive adversary is doable, but not is part of the current
implementation
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〈“sign-share”, s, v, σi(h)〉 from a replica i if (1) its view equals
view; (2) no previous “sign-share” with the same sequence s
has been accepted for this view from replica i; (3) the verifiable
threshold signature σi(h) passes the verification.
Upon a C-collector accepting 3 f + c + 1 distinct sign-share
messages it forms a combined signature σ(h), and then sends
〈“full-commit-proof”, s, v, σ(h)〉 to all replicas.
Commit trigger: a replica accepts
〈“full-commit-proof”, s, v, σ(h)〉 if it accepted
〈“pre-prepare”, s, v, r, h〉, h = H(s | |v | |r) and σ(h) is a
valid signature for h. Upon accepting a full-commit-proof
message, the replica commits r as the requests for sequence
s.
D. Execution and Acknowledgement
The main difference of our execution algorithm from pre-
vious work is the use of threshold signatures and single
client responses. Once a replica has a consecutive sequence
of committed decision blocks it participates in a two phase
protocol: sign-state, execute-proof.
Roughly speaking, in the sign-state phase each replica signs
its state using its f + 1 threshold signature and sends it to
the E-collectors. In the execute-proof phase, each E-collector
generates a succinct execution certificate. It then sends this
certificate back to the replicas and also sends each client a
certificate indicating its operation(s) were executed.
Execute trigger and sign state: when all decisions up
to sequence s are executed, and r is the committed request
block for sequence s, then replica i updates its state to Ds by
executing the requests r sequentially on the state Ds−1.
Replica i then updates its digest on the state to
d = digest(Ds), signs d by computing pii(d) and
sends 〈“sign-state”, s, pii(d)〉 to the set of E-collectors
E-collectors(s).
Execute-proof phase: an E-collector for s accepts a
〈“sign-state”, s, pii(d)〉 from a replica i if pii(d) passes the
verification test.
Upon accepting f + 1 sign-state messages, it com-
bines them into a single signature pi(d) and sends
〈“full-execute-proof”, s, pi(d)〉 to all replicas. Replicas that
receive full-execute-proof messages verify the signature to
accept.
Then the E-collector, for each request o ∈ r at position l
sends to the client k that issued o an execution acknowledge-
ment, 〈“execute-ack”, s, l, val, o, pi(d), proof (o, l, s,D, val)〉,
where val is the response to o, proof (o, l, s,D, val) is a proof
that o was executed and val is the response at the state whose
digest is from Ds and pi(d) is a signature that the digest of
Ds is d.
The client, accepts 〈“execute-ack”, s, l, val, o, pi(d), P〉 if
pi(d) is a valid signature and verify(d, o, val, s, l, P) = true.
Upon accepting an execute-ack message the client marks o
as executed and sets val as its return value. If the client timer
expires then the client re-tries requests and asks for a regular
PBFT style acknowledgement from f + 1.
E. Linear-PBFT
This is a fall-back protocol that can provide progress when
the fast path cannot make progress. This protocol is an adapta-
tion of PBFT that is optimized to use threshold signatures and
linear communication, avoiding all-to-all communication by
using the primary as collector in the intermediate stage and as
a fallback collector for commitment collection and execution
collection. To guarantee progress when the primary is non-
faulty, we use c + 1 collectors and stagger the collectors so
that the c+1st collector to activate is always the primary. The
worst case communication is O(cn) which is O(n) when c is a
constant (say c = 2). In particular choosing c = 0 for the fall
back protocol would guarantee O(n) messages (one can still
have more collectors in the fast path).
In linear-PBFT, instead of broadcasting messages to all
replicas, we use the primary as a single collector (or use
c + 1 collectors for a small constant c ≤ 2) that composes
the threshold signatures into a single signature message. This
reduces the number of messages and public key operations to
linear, and makes each message contain just one public-key
signature. We call this operation broadcast-via-collector: each
replica sends its message only to the c + 1 collectors, each
collector waits to aggregate a threshold signature and then
sends it to all replicas.
Sign-share phase: we modify the sign-share message of
replica i to include both σi(h) (needed for the fast path) and
τi(h) (needed for the Linear PBFT path).
Trigger for Linear-PBFT: A C-collector (including the
primary) that received enough threshold shares (via sign-share
messages) to create τ(h) but not to create σ(h) waits for a
timeout to expire before sending a prepare message to all:
〈“prepare”, s, v, τ(h)〉. This timer controls how long to wait
for the fast path before reverting to the PBFT path, we use an
adaptive protocol based on past network profiling to control
this timer.
Prepare phase: Replica i accepts 〈“prepare”, s, v, τ(h)〉 if
(1) its view equals v; (2) no previous “prepare” with sequence
s has been accepted for this view by i; (3) τ(h) passes its
verification. Replica i sends 〈“commit”, s, v, τi(τ(h))〉 to all the
collectors.
PBFT commit-proof phase: A C-collector (including
the primary) that received enough threshold shares to cre-
ate τ(τ(h)) sends a full-commit-proof-slow message to all:
〈“full-commit-proof-slow”, s, v, τ(τ(h))〉.
Commit trigger for Linear-PBFT: If a replica
receives 〈“full-commit-proof-slow”, s, v, τ(τ(h))〉 and
〈“pre-prepare”, s, v, r, h〉 it verifies that h = H(s | |v | |r)
then commits r as the decision block at sequence s.
F. Garbage Collection and Checkpoint Protocol
A decision block at sequence s can have three states:
(1) Committed - when at least one non-faulty replica has
committed s; (2) Executed - when at least one non-faulty
replica has committed all blocks from 1 to s; (3) Stable -
when at least f + 1 non-faulty replicas have executed s.
When a decision block at sequence s is stable we can
garbage collect all previous decisions. As in PBFT we peri-
7odically (every win/2) execute a checkpoint protocol in order
to update ls the last stable sequence number.
To avoid the overhead of the quadratic PBFT checkpoint
protocol, the second way to update ls is to add the following re-
striction. A replica only participates in a fast path of sequence
s if s is between le and le + (win/4) where le is the last exe-
cuted sequence number. With this restriction, when a replica
commits in the fast path on s it sets ls := max{ls, s−(win/4)}.
G. View Change Protocol
The view change protocol handles the non-trivial com-
plexity of having two commit modes: Fast-Path and Linear-
PBFT. Protocols having two modes like [18], [40], [46], [54]
have to carefully handle cases where both modes provide
a value to adopt and must explicitly choose the right one.
SBFT implements a new view change protocol that maintains
both safety and liveness while handling the challenges of two
concurrent modes. SBFT’s view change has been carefully
implemented 2, rigorously analyzed and tested3.
View change trigger: a replica triggers a view change when
a timer expires or if it receives a proof that the primary is faulty
(either via a publicly verifiable contradiction or when f + 1
replicas complain).
View-change phase: Each replica i maintains a variable ls
which is the last stable sequence number. It prepares values
xls, xls+1, . . . , xls+win as follows. Set xls = pi(dls) to be the signed
digest on the state whose sequence is ls. For each ls < j ≤
ls + win set xj = (lmj, f mj) to be a pair of values as follows:
Set lmj to be τ(τ(hj)) if a full-commit-proof-slow was
accepted for sequence j; otherwise set lmj to be (τ(hj), vj)
where vj is the highest view for sequence j for which 2 f +c+1
prepares were accepted with hash hj in view vj ; otherwise set
lmj := “no commit“.
Set f mj to be σ(hj) if a full-commit-proof was accepted
for sequence j; otherwise set f mj to be (σi(hj), vj) where vj
is the highest view for sequence j for which a pre-prepare
was accepted with hash hj at view vj ; otherwise set f mj :=
“no pre-prepare”.
Replica i sends to the new primary of view v + 1 the
message 〈“view-change”, v, ls, xls, xls+1, . . . , xls+win〉 where v is
the current view number and xls, . . . , xls+win as defined above.
New-view phase: The new primary gathers 2 f +2c+1 view
change messages from replicas. The new primary initiates a
new view by sending a set of 2 f +2c+1 view change messages.
Accepting a New-view: When a replica receives a set I of
|I | = 2 f +2c+1 view change message it processes slots one by
one. It starts with ls, the highest valid stable sequence number
in all view-change messages, and goes up to ls+win. For each
such slot, a replica either decides it can commit a value, or
it adopts it as a pre-prepare by the new primary, according to
the algorithm below.
If a replica receives σ(?) or τ(τ(?))), it decides it. Else, it
adopts a safe value:
2SBFT has been actively developed and hardened for over 2 years.
3We ran experiments with hundreds of replicas, doing tens of thousands
of view changes, and have tests for Primaries sending partial, equivocating
and/or stale information.
Safe values: A value y is safe for sequence slot if the only
safe thing for the new primary to do is to propose y for the
sequence slot in the new view.
Roughly speaking, y will be the value that is induced by
the highest view for which there is a potential value that could
have been committed in a previous view. Defining this requires
carefully defining the highest view for which there is a value in
each of the two commit paths and then taking the highest view
between the two paths. If there is no value that needs to be
adopted, we fill the sequence with a special no-op operation.
More precisely, computing y given I is done as follows:
Set ls to be the highest last stable value lsi sent in I such
that i sent pi(dlsi ) which is correct (this is a proof that lsi is a
valid checkpoint). Fix a slot j within the range [ls..(ls+win)].
Let X = {xi}i∈I be the set of values by the members I for
the slot. Since each x ∈ X is a pair we split into two sets
X = (LX,FX). If a member in I sent values only up to a lower
sequence position, then we can simulate as if these missing
values are x = (“no commit“, “no pre prepare“).
If FX contains σ(h) or LX contains τ(τ(h)) then let y be h
and commit once the message is known; otherwise
(1) If LX contains at least one τ(h) then let τ(h∗) be the
τ signature with the highest view v∗ in LX and let req∗ be
the corresponding value. Formally: v∗ = max{v | ∃(τ(h), v) ∈
LX, h = H( j | |v | |req)}, req∗ = {req | ∃(τ(h), v∗) ∈ LX, h =
H( j | |v∗ | |req)}. Otherwise, if LX contains no (τ(h), v) then set
v∗ := −1.
(2) We say that a value req′ is fast for v if there exists
f +c+1 messages in FX and for each such message (σi(h), v) ∈
FX it is the case that h = H( j | |v′ | |req′) and v′ ≥ v. Let vˆ be
the highest view such that there exists a value req′ that is fast
for v. If its unique, let ˆreq the corresponding fast value for
vˆ. Formally: f ast(req′, v) = 1 iff ∃M ⊂ FX, |M | = f + c +
1, ∀(σi(h), v′) ∈ M, h = H( j | |v′ | |req′) ∧ v′ ≥ v, vˆ = max{v |
∃req′ | f ast(req′, v) = 1}, ˆreq = {req′ | f ast(req′, vˆ) = 1}.
If no such vˆ exists or if for vˆ there is more than one potential
value ˆreq then set vˆ := −1 .
(3) If v∗ ≥ vˆ and v∗ > −1 then set y := 〈“pre-prepare”, j, v+
1, req∗,H( j | |v + 1| |req∗)〉.
Otherwise if vˆ > v∗ then set y := 〈“pre-prepare”, j, v +
1, ˆreq,H( j | |v + 1)| | ˆreq)〉.
Otherwise set y := 〈“pre-prepare”, j, v + 1, “null”,H( j | |v +
1| |“null”)〉, where “null” is the no-op operation.
1) Efficient view change via pipelining: Currently SBFT
allows committing a sequence number x before the pre-prepare
information for sequence numbers < x have arrived. This
allows SBFT a high degree of parallelism. This also means
that like PBFT, during a view change SBFT needs to suggest
a value for each sequence number between ls and ls + win.
An alternative approach is to commit sequence number
x only after all the pre-prepare messages of all sequences
≤ x have arrived and x’s hash is a commitment to the
whole history. Concretely, hx is a hash not of (r | |s | |v) but
of (r | |s | |v | |hx−1). This means that when a primary commits
sequence number x it is implicitly committing all the sequence
numbers ≤ x in the same decision.
With these changes, we can have a more efficient view
change. Instead of sending pre-prepare values (with proof) for
8each sequence number from ls to ls + win, it is sufficient for
the new primary to gather from each replica just two pairs (1)
the first pair is (hj, v) where v is the highest view for which
the replica has τ(hj) and j is the slot number (assume v := −1
if no such view exists); (2) the second pair is (h′j, v′) where
v′ is the highest view for which the replica has f + c + 1
pre-prepare messages with hj where j is the slot number.
As before, the primary gathers 2 f +2c+1 such messages and
chooses the highest view from (v, h) and (v′, h′) (preferring
(v, h) if there is a tie).
The advantage of this view change is that just two values
are sent irrespective of the size of the window.
VI. SAFETY
Safety is captured in the following Theorem:
Theorem VI.1. If any two non-faulty replicas commit on a
decision block for a given sequence number then they both
commit on the same decision block.
Fix a sequence number j and let v′ be smallest view number
at which some non-faulty replica commits on a decision block.
Let the hash of this decision block on sequence number j be
h where h = H( j | |v′ | |req). There are two cases to consider:
(1) at least one of the non-faulty that committed at view v′
committed due to a signature τ(τ(h)) or (2) all the committing
non-faulty at v′ committed due to a signature σ(h). We will
now prove Theorem VI.1 by looking at each cases separately.
Lemma VI.2. If a non-faulty commits to req on sequence j
due to τ(τ(h)) at view v′ then there exists a set SC of f +c+1
non-faulty replicas such that for any view v ≥ v′:
1) For each replica r ∈ SC, at view v, replica r’s highest
commit proof lmj = τ(τ(h)) is for hash h = H( j | |v′′ | |req)
such that v ≥ v′′ ≥ v′.
2) Any valid signature τ(h′) where h′ = H( j | |v′′ | |req′′)
generated by the adversary has the property that either
req′′ = req or v′′ < v′.
3) If v = v′ then there are at most f + c non-faulty that
accepted a pre-prepare with some req′ , req at view v′.
4) If v > v′ then there are no non-faulty replicas that
accepted a pre-prepare with some req′ , req at view
v′.
Proof. The proof is by induction on v for all v ≥ v′. We start
with the base case of v = v′. Property 1 holds since some non-
faulty committed after seeing 2 f + c + 1 commit messages on
h = H( j | |v′ | |req), of which at least f + c + 1 came from
non-faulty. Fix SC to be this set of non-faulty. Property 2 and
3 hold since in view v′ at least f + c + 1 non-faulty send a
pre-prepare for h and a non-faulty will send at most one pre-
prepare per view, so there can be at most f + c non-faulty that
sent a pre-prepare for req′ , req at view v = v′. Finally, note
that property 4 is vacuously true.
Assume the properties hold by induction on all views
smaller than v and consider view v. From property 1 of the
induction hypothesis on view v−1, any view change to view v
must include at least one message τ(h) with h = H( j | |v′′ | |req)
from SC. This is true because any view change set is of size
2 f + 2c + 1 and so it must intersect the set SC from property
1. From property 2, v′′ is larger than any other τ(h′) for
req′ , req included in any view change set. From properties
3 and 4 it must be the case that if there are f + c + 1 replicas
that send pre-prepare for for req′ , req then at least c + 1 of
them are honest and hence must be of view at most v′.
Recall that in the view change protocol we define that req′
is fast for view u if there exists f + c + 1 messages in FX
and for each such message (σi(z), u) ∈ FX it is the case that
z = H( j | |v′ | |req′) and v′ ≥ u. Therefore it must be the case
that if req′ is fast for view u then u ≤ v′. Also recall that in the
view change protocol v∗ is defined to be the highest view with
a prepare message τ(h∗) in LX , so we have v∗ ≥ v′. Note that
even if v∗ = v′ then the outcome of the view change protocl
(the value yj) will use req over req′ (this is where our view
change algorithm prefers the slow path proof over the fast path
proof).
Together this means that the only possible outcome of the
view change will be to set yj for view v to have the value req.
This is true because property 1 shows that req will be seen in a
prepare message, property 2 that it will be associated with the
maximal prepare, and property 3+4 that if ˆreq is chosen then
it must be that ˆreq = req. This proves property 4 (property 3
is vacuously true).
Given property 4 on view v we now prove properties 1 and 2
for view v. Since the only safe value for view v is req then the
only change in SC is that a replica may update its highest view
to v (if the Primary in v manages to send a prepare message
in view v) but this must be for the same block content req
so property 1 holds. Similarly property 2 holds because no
non-faulty we accept in v a pre-prepare for req′ , req and
hence no such τ(h′) can be generated. 
We now do a similar analysis for the case that all committing
non-faulty at v′ do it due to a signature σ(h). Importantly,
property 3 below is slightly stronger than property 3 above.
Lemma VI.3. If a non-faulty commits to req on sequence j
due to σ(h) in view v′ then there exists a set FC of 2 f + c+1
non-faulty replicas such that for any view v ≥ v′:
1) For each replica r ∈ FC, in view v, the highest view
v′′ for which a pre-prepare was accepted with hash h =
H( j | |v′′ | |req′′) has the property that v′′ ≥ v′ and req′′ =
req.
2) Any valid signature τ(h′) where h′ = H( j | |v′′ | |req′′)
generated by the adversary has the property that either
req′′ = req or v′′ < v′.
3) If v = v′ then there are at most c non-faulty that accepted
a pre-prepare with some req′ , req at view v′.
4) If v > v′ then there are no non-faulty that accepted a
pre-prepare with some req′ , req at view v′.
Proof. The proof is by induction on v for all v ≥ v′. We start
with the base case of v = v′. Property 1 holds since some non-
faulty committed after seeing 3 f + c+1 pre-prepare messages
on h = H( j | |v′ | |req), of which at least 2 f + c + 1 came from
non-faulty. Property 2 and 3 hold since in view v = v′ at least
2 f +c+1 non-faulty send a pre-prepare for h and a non-faulty
will send at most one pre-prepare per view, so there can be at
9most c non-faulty that sent a pre-prepare for some req′ , req
(property 4 is vacuously true).
Assume the properties hold by induction on all views
smaller than v and consider view v. From the induction
hypothesis property 1 on view v − 1 we have that any view
change to v must include at least f + c + 1 messages of the
form σi(h) with h = H( j | |v′′ | |req) from i ∈ FC. This is true
because any view change set is of size 2 f + 2c + 1 and so
it must intersect FC with at least f + c + 1 members. From
the induction hypothesis on property 3 and 4 it follows that if
there are f +c+1 replicas that send pre-prepare for req′ , req
then it must be the case that at least one of the c + 1 honest
must be of view that is strictly smaller than v′. This implies
that if some req′ , req is a fast for u then u < v′. Hence req
will be the unique value that is fast at view at least v′ and
hence the view change protocol will set ˆreq = req.
We still need to show that ˆreq = req will be chosen over
any req∗ , req. From the induction hypothesis on property 2
it follows that for req∗ , req it must be that v∗ < v′ and hence
in the view change vˆ will cause ˆreq = req to be selected.
Together this means that the only outcome of the view
change will be to set yj for view v to have the value req.
This is true because property 1 shows that req will be seen at
fast for at least v′, property 2 that v∗ will be strictly smaller if
req∗ , req , and property 3+4 imply that if ˆreq is chosen then
it must be that ˆreq = req. This proves property 4 (property 3
is vacuously true).
Given property 4 on v we now prove properties 1 and 2.
Since the only safe value for v is req then the only change
in SC is that replicas may update their highest view of a pre-
prepare to view v but this must be for req so property 1 holds.
Similarly property 2 holds because no non-faulty we accept in
v a pre-prepare for req′ , req and hence no such τ(h′) can
be generated. 
Theorem VI.1 follows directly from the the two lemma
above.
VII. LIVENESS
SBFT is deterministic so lacks liveness in the asynchronous
mode, due to FLP [37]. As in PBFT [27], liveness is obtained
by striking a balance between making progress in the current
view and moving to a new view. SBFT uses the techniques
of PBFT [27] tailored to a larger deployment: (1) exponential
back-off view change timer; (2) replica issues a view change
if it hears f + 1 replicas issue a view change; (3) a view can
continue making progress even if f or less replicas send a view
change. Finally SBFT uses c + 1 collectors to make progress
in the fast path and in the common path we ensure that one
of the collectors is the primary.
Unlike some protocols, our protocol can always wait for at
most n− f messages to make progress both in the common path
and in the view change (for example in PBFT journal version
you may need to wait for more messages in the view change
protocol). Hence not only is our protocol clearly deadlock free,
it is also reactive, meaning that after GST it makes progress
at the speed of the fastest n− f replicas and does not need to
wait for the maximum network delay.
We still need to show that progress is made after GST with
a non-faulty primary. Again this is quite strait forward and
follows from the fact that in the common mode the Primary
is also a collector.
Finally we note that the liveness of the view change protocol
follows from the following pattern: the primary makes a deci-
sion based on signed messages (its proof) and then forwards
both the decision and the signed messages (its proof) so all
replicas can repeat exactly the same computation.
VIII. SBFT IMPLEMENTATION
SBFT is implemented in C++ and follows some parts of the
design of the original PBFT code [1], [27], [28], in particular
PBFT’s state transfer mechanism. SBFT has been in active
development for over two years.
Cryptography implementation Cryptographic primitives
(RSA 2048, SHA256, HMAC) are implemented using the
Crypto++ library [6]. To implement threshold BLS, we use
RELIC [16], a cryptographic library with support for pairings.
We use the BN-P254 [21] elliptic curve, which provides the
same security as 2048-bit RSA (i.e., 110-bit security) even
with recent developments on discrete-log attacks [19], [57].
To reduce latency associated with combining threshold BLS
based shares (in the collectors) we parallelized the independent
exponentiations and use a background thread. In the fast path,
as long as no failure is detected, we use a BLS group signature
(n-out-of-n threshold) which provides smaller latency than
BLS threshold signatures. We implemented a mechanism
to automatically switch to and from group signatures and
threshold signatures based on recent history.
SBFT batching and parallelism parameters We use an
adaptive leaning algorithm that dynamically modifies the size
of the parameter batch based on the number of currently
running concurrent sequence numbers. The batch size is the
minimum number of client operations in each block. The
number of decision blocks that can be committed in parallel
is win = 256. The value active-window = b(n − 1)/(c + 1)c
is the actual number of decision blocks that are committed in
parallel by the primary.
Blockchain smart contract implementation The EVM
implementation we used is based on cpp-ethereum [2]. We
integrated storage-related commands with our key-value store
interface and use RocksDB [5] as its backend.
IX. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate SBFT by deploying 200 replicas over a wide
area geo-distributed network. All experiments are configured
to withstand f = 64 Byzantine failures. Following, [31] SBFT
uses public-key signed client requests and server messages.
At the time of the experiments, we could not find other
BFT implementations that (1) was freely available online; and
(2) could reliably work on a real (not simulated) world scale
WAN and withstand f = 64 failures. The freely available
code for PBFT could not scale and was not updated in the
last 10 years. The code for Zyzzyva [46] contains a serious
safety violation [9] and did not contain a state transfer module.
Both BizCoin [43], [71] and Omniledger [44] have GitHub
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repositories but have only reported simulation results. Other
projects like Algorand [39] have only simulations and no
open source code. Moreover the focus on these systems is
on permisionless models using proof-of-work or proof-of-
stake not the standard permissioned model. Comparing to
these systems is left as future work (once there is a freely
accessible version that is robust enough to be readily deployed
and support EVM smart contracts).
Our goal is to report and compare in a real world deploy-
ment on a Wide Area Network that actually persists transac-
tions to disk and executes real world EVM smart contracts.
We therefore spent several months significantly improving,
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fixing and hardening an existing PBFT code-base in order to
make it reliably work in our experimental setting. We call this
implementation scale optimized PBFT.
We note that Souse et al [68] use an implementation of
PBFT called BFT-SMaRt [20]. However, it seems that the
WAN deployment reported in [68] scales to only f ≤ 3 in
a LAN and f = 1 for WAN. Our baseline scale optimized
PBFT is tuned to provide better scalability. Moreover it was
not clear to us how to run EVM contracts on top of this system.
In our experiments we start with a scale optimized PBFT
implementation and then show how each of the 4 ingredients
improves performance as follows: (1) linear PBFT reduces
communication and improves throughput at the cost of latency;
(2) adding a fast path reduces latency; (3) using cryptography
to allow a single message acknowledgement improves per-
formance when there are many clients; (4) adding redundant
servers to improve resilience improves the latency-throughput
trade-off.
For micro-benchmarks we run a simple Key-Value ser-
vice. For our main evaluation we use real transactions from
Ethereum that are executed and committed to disk (via
RocksDB). We take half a Million Ethereum transactions,
spanning a time of 2 months, which included ∼ 5000 contracts
created.
We compare the following replication protocols:
(1) PBFT (the baseline): A scale optimized implementation
of PBFT.
(2) Linear-PBFT (adding ingredient 1): A modification of
PBFT that avoids quadratic communication by using a collec-
tor.
(3) Fast Path + Linear PBFT (adding ingredients 1 and 2):
Linear-PBFT with an added fast-path.
(4) SBFT with c=0 (adding ingredients 1,2, and 3): Linear-
PBFT with an added fast-path and an execution collector that
allows clients to receive signed message acknowledgements.
(5) SBFT with c=8 (adding all 4 ingredients): Adding redun-
dant servers to better adapt to network variance and failures.
Continent scale WAN. In this scenario we spread the
replicas and clients across 5 different regions in the same
continent. In each region we use two availability zones and
in each zone we deploy one machine with 32 VCPUs, Intel
Broadwell E5-2686v4 processors with clock speed 2.3 GHz
and connected via a 10 Gigabit network.
We deployed more than one replica or client into a sin-
gle machine. This was done due to economic and logistic
constraints. One may wonder if the fact that we packed
multiple replicas into a single machine significantly modified
our performance measurements. To assess this we repeated our
experiments once with 10 machines (1 per availability zone,
each machine had about 20 replica VMs) and then with 20
machines (2 per availability zone, each machine had about 10
replica VMs). The results of these experiments were almost the
same. We conclude that the effects of communication delays
between having 10 or 20 machines have marginal impact in
a world scale WAN. Not surprisingly, our experiments show
that in a world scale WAN, performance depends at least on
the median latency and that having 10−20% of replicas with a
much lower latency does not modify or increase performance.
World scale WAN. In this scenario we spread the replicas
and clients across 15 regions spread over all continents. In
each region we deploy one machine (we also tested running
two machines per region with similar results).
Measurements Key-Value store benchmark: each client se-
quentially sends 1000 requests. In the no batching mode each
request is a single put operation for writing a random value to a
random key in the Key-Value store. In the batching mode each
request contains 64 operations. This models a reasonable smart
contract workload. Replicas execute operations by changing
their state and does a re-sync using the state transfer protocol
(see Section VIII and [28]) if it falls behind. We ran these
experiments on a continent scale WAN.
Smart-Contract benchmark: we used 500,000 real transac-
tions from Ethereum to test the SBFT ledger protocol. Replicas
execute each contract by running the EVM byte-code and
persisting the state on-disk. Each client sends operations by
batching transactions into chunks of 12KB (on average about
50 transactions per batch). We ran these experiments on both
a continent scale WAN and a world scale WAN.
Key-Value benchmark evaluation. The results of the Key-
Value benchmark are shown in Figures 2 and 3. We first
observe that compared to our scale optimized PBFT, the linear-
PBFT protocol provides better throughput (2k per sec vs 1.5k
per sec) when the system is under load (128 to 256 clients)
with batching. Smaller effects appear also in the no batching
case. We conclude that reducing the communication from
quadratic to linear by using a collector significantly improves
throughput at some cost in latency.
To improve latency we then add a fast path to linear-PBFT.
This significantly increases throughput to 2.8k per sec. As
expected, in the no failure executions the fast path seems to
improve both latency and throughput, but does not help when
there are failures.
We then see that adding an execution collector that allows
clients to receive just one message (instead of f + 1) for
acknowledgment significantly improves performance (latency
throughput trade-off) in all scenarios (no failures and with
failures). This shows that the communication from servers to
clients is a significant performance bottleneck.
Finally, by parameterizing SBFT for c = 8 we show the
effect of adding redundant servers. Not surprisingly, this makes
a big impact when there are f = 8 failures. In addition, we see
significant advantages in the f = 0 and f = 64 cases. This is
probably because adding redundancy reduces the variance and
effects of slightly slow servers or staggering network links.
Smart-Contract benchmark evaluation. In the continent
scale WAN experiment SBFT measured 378 transaction per
second with a median latency of 254 milliseconds. In the same
setting our scale optimized PBFT obtained just 204 transac-
tion per second with a median latency of 538 milliseconds.
We conclude that in the content-scale SBFT simultaneously
provides 2x better latency and almost 2x better throughput.
In the world scale WAN experiments SBFT obtained 172
transaction per second with a median latency of 622 millisec-
onds. Scale optimized PBFT obtained 98 transaction per sec-
ond with a median latency of 934 milliseconds. We conclude
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that in a world-scale SBFT simultaneously provides almost 2x
better throughput and about 1.5x better latency.
We note that just executing these smart contracts on a single
computer (and committing the results to disk) without running
any replication provides a 840 transaction per second base line.
We conclude that adding a continent scale WAN 200 node
replication, SBFT obtains a 2x slowdown relative to the base
line. Adding a world-scale WAN 200 node replication, SBFT
obtains a 5x slowdown relative to the base line.
X. RELATED WORK
Byzantine fault tolerance was first suggested by Lamport
et al. [48]. Rampart [65] was one of pioneering systems to
consider Byzantine fault tolerance for state machine replica-
tion [47].
SBFT is based on many advances aimed at making Byzan-
tine fault tolerance practical. PBFT [27], [28] and the extended
framework of BASE [66] provided many of the foundations,
frameworks, optimizations and techniques on which SBFT is
built. SBFT uses the conceptual approach of separating com-
mitment from execution that is based on Yin et al. [76]. Our
linear message complexity fast path is based on the techniques
of Zyzzyva [45], [46] and its theoretical foundations [54].
Our use of a hybrid model that provides better properties
for c ≤ f failures is inspired by the parameterized model
of Martin and Alvisi [54]. Up-Right [30] studied a different
model that assumes many omission failures and just a few
Byzantine failures. Visigoth [64] further advocates exploiting
data center performance predictability and relative synchrony.
XFT [52] focuses on a model that limits the adversaries ability
to control both asynchrony and malicious replicas. In contrast,
SBFT provides safety even in the fully asynchronous model
when less than a third of replicas are malicious. Prime [12]
adds additional pre-rounds so that clients can be guaranteed a
high degree of fairness. Our protocol provides the same type
of weak fairness guarantees as in PBFT; we leave for further
work the question of adding stronger fairness properties to
SBFT.
A2M [29], TrInc [49] and Veronese et al. [73] use secure
hardware to obtain non-equivocation. They present a Byzan-
tine fault tolerant replication that is safe in asynchronous
models even when n = 2 f + 1. CheapBFT [42] relies on
an FPGA-based trusted subsystem to improve fault tolerance.
SBFT is a software solution and as such is bounded by the
n ≥ 3 f + 1 lower bound [36].
Our use of public key cryptography (as opposed to MAC
vectors) and threshold signatures follows the approach of [25]
(also see [13], [14], [31]). We heavily rely on threshold BLS
signatures [22], [23]. Several recent systems mention they plan
to use BLS threshold signatures [44], [56], [70], [71]. To the
best of our knowledge we are the first to deploy threshold BLS
in a real system.
An alternative to the primary-backup based state machine
replication approach is to use Byzantine quorum systems [53]
and make each client a proposer. This approach was taken by
QU [8] and HQ [32] and provides very good scalability when
write contention is low. SBFT follows the primary-backup
paradigm that funnels multiple requests though a designated
primary leader. This allows SBFT to benefit from batching
which is crucial for throughput performance in large-scale
multi-client scenarios.
Recent work is aimed at providing even better liveness
guarantees. Honeybadger [60] is the first practical Byzantine
fault tolerance replication system that leverages randomization
to circumvent the FLP [37] impossibility. Honeybadger and
more recently BEAT [34] provide liveness even when the
network is fully asynchronous and controlled by an adver-
sarial scheduler. SPBT follows the DLS/Paxos/viewstamp-
replication paradigm [35], [47], [50] extended to Byzantine
faults that guarantees liveness only when the network is
synchronous.
Algorand [39] provides a permissionless system that can
support thousands of users and implements a BFT engine
that chooses a random dynamic committee of roughly 2000
users. However, Algorand’s scalability was only evaluated in
a simulation of a wide area network. Even under best case
no-failure simulation conditions, Algorand seems to provide
almost 100x slower latency (60 seconds) relative to SBFT
(600 milliseconds). SBFT is experimentally evaluated in a
real world-scale geo-replicated wide area network deployment,
executing real smart contracts, persisting their output to disk
and testing scenarios with failures.
FastBFT [51] shares many of the properties of SBFT.
It also focuses on a linear version of PBFT and a single
message client acknowledgement. FastBFT decentralizes trust
in a scalable way, but it relies on secure hardware and es-
sentially centralizes its security assumptions by relying on the
security of a single hardware vendor: Intel’s SGX. FastBFT’s
performance is evaluated only on a local area network. SBFT
assumes commodity hardware that does not rely on any single
hardware vendor. SBFT is extensively evaluated in a real
world-scale geo-distributed deployment.
XI. CONCLUSION
We implemented SBFT, a state-of-the-art Byzantine fault
tolerant replication library and experimentally validated that
it provides significantly better performance for large deploy-
ments over a wide-area geo-distributed deployment. SBFT
performs well when there are tens of malicious replicas, its
performance advantage increases as the number of clients
increases.
We have learned that measuring real executions (not sim-
ulations) on hundreds of replicas over a world scale WAN
and persisting real world smart contracts on disk is non-
trivial and requires careful system tuning and engineering. Our
experiments show that each one of our algorithmic ingredients
improves the measured performance. For about two hundred
replicas, the overall performance advantage show that SBFT
simultaneously provides almost 2x better throughput and about
1.5x better latency relative to a highly optimized system that
implements the PBFT protocol.
We have shown that SBFT can be robustly deployed for
hundreds of replicas and withstand tens of Byzantine failures.
We believe that the advantage of linear protocols (like SBFT)
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over quadratic protocols will be even more profound at higher
scales. Measuring real deployments of thousands of replicas
that withstand hundreds of Byzantine failures is beyond the
scope of this work.
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